Optimum Currency Areas and the European Experience: An Examination of Diverging Competitiveness among Key EU Nations by Jablonski, Karol
Union College
Union | Digital Works
Honors Theses Student Work
6-2017
Optimum Currency Areas and the European
Experience: An Examination of Diverging
Competitiveness among Key EU Nations
Karol Jablonski
Union College - Schenectady, NY
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalworks.union.edu/theses
Part of the Economic Theory Commons, Finance Commons, and the International Economics
Commons
This Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Work at Union | Digital Works. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors
Theses by an authorized administrator of Union | Digital Works. For more information, please contact digitalworks@union.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jablonski, Karol, "Optimum Currency Areas and the European Experience: An Examination of Diverging Competitiveness among Key
EU Nations" (2017). Honors Theses. 45.
https://digitalworks.union.edu/theses/45
  
 
Optimum Currency Areas and the European Experience: An Examination of 
Diverging Competitiveness among Key EU Nations 
 
 
by 
 
 
Karol Aleksander Jablonski 
 
 
*  * * * * * * * * 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for 
Honors in the Department of Economics 
 
 
UNION COLLEGE 
March, 2017 
 
 
	 ii	
 
Abstract 
JABLONSKI, ALEKSANDER KAROL. Optimum Currency Areas and the European 
Experience: An Examination of Diverging Competitiveness among Key EU Nations 
Department of Economics 
 
ADVISOR: Eshragh Motahar  
 
Now, in its 18th year of existence, the European single currency – the most daring act of 
integration since the launch of the European integration project – is facing its biggest challenge 
yet. Greece, Portugal and Ireland are still experiencing economic hardships, even after receiving 
substantial bailout packages in order to avoid defaulting on their debt. Italy and Spain – the third 
and fourth largest economies in the Eurozone – are close behind, combining high public debts, 
large budget deficits, and low growth. Germany and France, considered the most robust 
economies of the Eurozone, are feeling the strain of supporting their weaker partners, in an 
attempt to save the euro. The economic importance of this crisis is that the future of Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU), the Eurozone, and the European economic integration is at stake.  
After a decade of economic preparations and convergence in light of optimal currency 
area criteria, these Eurozone countries had an extraordinary opportunity to pave the way for 
rapid economic development and modernization, with sustainable growth rates, and new, open 
and high quality economic and political institutions after joining this common currency area. 
Although the economic environment was truly favorable, the ability to exploit these advantages 
properly for countries, specifically the PIIG countries, was largely based on two major 
conditions: maintain fiscal discipline and sound finances, while increasing the productivity and 
the competitiveness of their respective economies. Despite all the PIIG countries failing to 
maintain fiscal discipline, certain PIIG countries, such as Greece, failed to maintain 
	 iii	
competiveness in international markets through depressing wages and productivity enhancement. 
After the examination of productivity, unit labor costs, hourly wage rates, and net export 
performance as a percentage of GDP of Germany, France, and PIIG countries, I find that certain 
member countries, such as Greece, would be better off leaving the Eurozone, allowing it to 
regain control over its exchange rate in order to restore its competitiveness in international 
markets. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
Introduction 
 
The Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and euro was the dream of many a politician 
in the years following WWII. This dream soon became a reality through Europe’s bold 
experiment in kick starting a long, slow process that ultimately led to the creation of the EMU. It 
is important to note that long before the EMU and euro was even developed, the theory of 
optimum currency areas was brought into the world of economics through Mundell (1961). His 
theory of optimum currency areas argues the optimal area for a system of fixed exchange rates is 
on that is highly economically integrated. More specifically, economic integration means free 
flows of trade, labor, as well as both financial and physical capital.  
Optimal currency area theory has evolved expansively since Mundell coined this theory. 
Much of the literature came before the Eurozone had actually taken place, demonstrating that 
traditionalist scholars, such as McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969), developed their arguments 
and suggested criteria in forming an optimal currency area without a functioning model. The 
three influential traditional scholars introduced economic conditions, such as labor mobility and 
wage and price flexibility, varying level of developments, such as economic production 
structures, or differing sector diversification regarding trade, all of which are considered relevant 
attributes for judging the optimality of a currency area. Moreover, once the European Union 
embarked on a monetary unification process, modern scholars have contributed to optimal 
currency literature by trying to fill in the gaps left by traditionalist scholars in determining 
whether the benefits of the Eurozone will outweigh the costs in the long run. Since the majority 
of existing literature has addressed theory of optimal currency areas in lack of practical 
implications, as well as in response to the development of the Eurozone, limited work has been 
	 2	
produced in examining whether or not the Eurozone is operating as an optimal currency area 
concerning the current crisis.   
The EMU project was the most decisive step in the process of European integration and 
cooperation. The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 established this EMU project, as well as set the 
criteria for its implementation. This treaty outlined convergence criteria integration regarding 
achieving exchange rate stability, price stability, and maintaining a restrictive fiscal policy for 
EU countries in becoming an EMU. The goal behind these convergence criteria was the smooth 
adoption of the new common currency, which required a significant harmonization of economic 
policies and macroeconomic conditions in the countries that wanted to participate in the EU. 
Moreover, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) was established thereafter in 1997 to ensure that 
the Maastricht Convergence Criteria would continue to apply once the common currency was 
launched. This pact was meant to ensure that no single member state, once a member of EMU, 
could free ride the system, for instance, by incurring high deficits and debt. It also aimed to 
enforce budget discipline and sound public finances among the countries participating in the 
euro. It is important to note that some EU members have not ratified all of the clauses before 
entering the Eurozone, indicating the weaknesses in the Maastricht Treaty, as well as the 
Stability and Growth Pact. Despite the fiscal and monetary harmonization in the late 1990s, large 
economic, structural and institutional disparities were still in place, and continued to exist after 
the creation of the Eurozone, which we will discuss in further detail in Chapter Three. Finally, 
after years of adjustment and convergence, the euro was adopted on January 1, 1999. 
Furthermore, after the birth of the euro, economists believed that reforms pertaining to 
improving labor market, wage, and price flexibility, would emerge from participation in a shared 
common currency area with a fixed exchange rate. Though Eurozone nations did show promise 
	 3	
in positively converging towards meeting several of the optimal currency area criteria, 
specifically with respect to trade, certain nations were not able to implement adequate labor 
market reforms, despite undertaking competitive real exchange rates that they had no control of. 
The reasoning behind this lack of responsiveness was due to the unaccounted excessive pressures 
from political economy forces, distorted incentives, as well as the “dependency on the perception 
of unlimited capacity to borrow based on implicit euro zone guarantee” according to Wihlborg 
(2010, p. 25). Therefore, incentives for not only maintaining fiscal discipline, but also more 
importantly, productivity reforms were very weak, especially in the case for Greece.   
Deciding to join the Eurozone also resulted in fixed exchange rates between all 
participating countries. The costs of entering the EU for these countries was forgoing an 
independent exchange rate and no longer having an independent monetary policy, where 
sovereign governments can no longer manage the exchange rate so as to address the country’s 
international competitiveness issues nor can they influence the money supply so as to address 
aggregate demand and/or inflation/deflation problems. These member states can therefore only 
compete in international markets with their fixed exchange rates where adjusting unit labor costs 
is their main option. To be more specific, in order to address international competitiveness 
issues, the only two options left under the Eurozone are wage decreases and/or productivity 
enhancements.  
Moreover, in this thesis, we will be examining the four variables to determine if 
sufficient, positive economic convergence and performance in terms of international 
competitiveness under the uniform policy of the ECB occurred for Germany, France, and PIIG 
countries since joining the Eurozone. It is important to understand of the relationship between 
the following under a fixed exchange rate regime like the Eurozone: (1) productivity, (2) unit 
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labor costs, (3) export price indices, and (4) net export performance as a percentage of GDP. To 
begin, the relationship between productivity and unit labor costs is that if unit labor costs rate is 
growing faster than rate of productivity, we have a competiveness problem. This indicates that 
the unit labor costs are too expensive for that country to be competitive in international markets 
as the per unit labor cost exceeds the per unit productivity. Now, for example, say workers in 
Region A are less competitive than workers in Region B via productivity rates, Region A can 
turn to depress their worker’s wages and/or productivity enhancement in order to reduce its cost 
of production to restore its competiveness in the international market. It is important to note that 
no currency devaluation can be performed since the country is under a fixed rate regime (e.g. the 
Eurozone). Furthermore, the decrease in wages causes unit labor costs to decrease, making the 
nation’s export price indices more competitive, or a decrease in its export price, and therefore 
increasing its net export performance as a percentage of GDP. However, as we will see later on 
in this thesis, a nation left with only the adjustment mechanisms of wage depression and/or 
productivity enhancement may not always be sufficient in maintaining and/or increasing its net 
export performance as percentage of GDP given its membership in a fixed rate regime. 
 This thesis will be structured as follow. Chapter Two will review prior literature 
pertinent to the traditional views on the optimal currency area theory, followed by the modern 
views on the optimal currency area theory. This chapter demonstrates that a nation’s cost and 
benefits from joining a fixed exchange rate regime such as the EMU depend on how integrated 
its economy is with those of potential members. Chapter Three will introduce the institutional 
background and convergence criteria leading up to the Eurozone, followed by an examination of 
the fiscal conditions and structural issues after its implementation. Chapter Four will present an 
analysis of the current account balances, productivity, unit labors costs, and hourly wage rates in 
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Germany, France, and the PIIG countries under the Eurozone.  Chapter Five will provide 
concluding remarks and considerations for follow up. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
Chronology of Deviating Economic Literature exploring OCAs 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter reviews the wide range of literature to the theory of optimum currency areas. 
Subsection 2.2 addresses the traditional views on the optimal currency area theory, followed by 
the modern views on the optimal currency area theory in subsection 2.3. The traditional 
contributors have developed relevant approaches in determining the way attributes of countries’ 
economies can influence the monetary efficiency gain of forming, or joining, an optimal 
exchange-rate regime. The modern contributors further developed research in light of the 
creation of European Union embarked on a monetary unification process, trying to fill in the 
gaps left by traditionalist scholars in determining whether the benefits of the Eurozone will 
outweigh the costs in the long run.  
 
2.2 Traditional views on the OCA Theory 
 
The Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and euro was the dream of many a politician 
in the years following WWII. Long before the EMU and euro were even developed, the theory of 
optimum currency areas was coined into the world of economics through Mundell. Before 
Mundell (1961) shed light on this topic, each country, traditionally, has sustained its own 
independent, national currency. It is important to note that the time period during which 
Mundell’s paper was written characterized by the Bretton Woods exchange rate regime, in 
addition to limited international capital mobility. Friedman (1953) played a significant role in 
spurring interest with respect to optimal currency areas, as he addressed the commonly debated 
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topic on the benefits and shortcomings of floating exchange rates. Friedman strongly argued for 
floating exchange rates because they serve as an adjusting mechanism in bringing the balance of 
crisis in the light of changes in aggregate demand, “averting the balance of payments crises that 
[he] believed were an inherent feature of fixed- but adjustable rate” as quoted in Dellas and 
Tavlas (2009, p. 8). He continued to observe that choosing a fixed exchange allows each country 
to pursue its own independent monetary policy, safeguarding each country in being wrapped in 
the monetary mistakes of others. Finally, Friedman (1953, p. 157-8) points out that fixed 
exchange rates hinder international trade, while floating exchange rates allow countries to 
remove exchange controls quickly, therefore promoting international trade and the wealth 
created by the multilateral division of labor. Friedman’s work about the choice of exchange rates, 
in strong favor of a floating regime, in the early 1950s played a significant role in reviving 
interest in optimum-currency-area analysis. 
 The primary contributor to the optimal currency area academia is Mundell (1961), who 
tried to not only refute Friedman’s argument for floating exchange rates, but also explores the 
characteristics of a country’s economy to determine whether or not countries should have 
separate currencies. Mundell begins by describing an optimum currency area as an optimal 
region for a common currency that is highly integrated with regards to free flows of goods and 
services, assets and physical capital, as well as labor mobility. It is important to note that optimal 
currency areas have costs and benefits for countries deciding whether to adhere to them. Mundell 
states that a region is considered optimal if its monetary efficiency gains exceed the costs of 
sharing a common currency. One significant monetary efficiency gain that occurs when an 
economy joins an optimal currency area is the low transaction costs. In joining a common 
currency area, Mundell demonstrates that countries avoid the uncertainty and international 
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transaction costs that incur when doing business transactions that different floating exchange 
rates involve. Therefore, since transaction costs are greatly reduced, trade becomes extensive 
between the member countries in the optimal currency area.  
 Furthermore, Mundell’s developed theory addresses the fact that the monetary efficiency 
gain of joining a common currency area depends on the amount of economic integration. Taking 
a step back, Mundell’s objective was to indicate what criteria would make the abandonment of a 
floating exchange rate regime less costly in the long run than suggested by Friedman. The 
distinguishing difference between Mundell and Friedman was that Mundell emphasized factor 
mobility integration as a necessary criterion to achieving an optimal currency area. The reason 
for this factor mobility, especially labor mobility, is that it serves as the adjustment mechanism 
in maintaining internal and external balance in the face of changes in inflation and employment 
due to shift of demand of products between regions. However, Mundell (1961, p. 659) points out 
that “the optimum currency area is not the world”, indicating that this adjustment mechanism 
only effectively works when national borders are redrawn to create optimal geographical 
regional areas with high labor mobility. Therefore, as stated by Broz (2005, p 55), the greater the 
labor mobility, when wages and prices are not flexible, within a region, “then that region should 
have a fixed exchange rate within its borders and flexible exchange rate” with each optimal 
regional area. 
Finally, Mundell proposed the criteria of wage and price flexibility on top of labor 
mobility among the members in a common currency area. The importance of this attribute 
regarding an optimum currency area presented by Broz (2005, p. 55) is shown in simplified 
scenario where the assumptions of two regions “which are not defined by national producers but 
as a group of producers that produce only homogenous products.” In this setup, if there is an 
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increase demand in for products from one region, let’s call it region A, to another region, let’s 
call it region B, then region A would increase wages as a response, leading to decrease in 
aggregate supply and an increase in price level. Region B would see a decrease demand, and 
experience the inverse of the chain of reactions given its membership in the common currency. 
Both regions would buy fewer products in Region A, while more products in Region B, thus 
demonstrating that the flexibility of wages and prices makes it easier to restore stability in the 
incident of asymmetric shocks in a common currency area. On the other side of the spectrum, if 
there is internal labor immobility, as well as wage and price stickiness, Mundell argues for a 
flexible exchange rate mechanism and autonomous monetary policies in those two particular 
areas. The relevance of this case is that Mundell identifies the incidence of asymmetric shocks in 
exchange of the variables previously mentioned in judging whether it is optimal for two regions 
to form a common currency area.  
 Mundell’s important contribution to the theory of optimum currency areas spurred 
McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969) to further identify characteristics when countries, or 
regions, are considering joining a fixed rate regime. McKinnon (1963) identified additional key 
criteria on top of Mundell’s work that economies of the members of the common currency area 
should possess in order to for the benefits to outweigh the costs of joining a fixed exchange rate 
system. The traditionalist scholar states that the openness of the economy in terms of the ratio of 
tradables to non-tradeables is extremely important with regards to adapting a fixed exchange 
rate. McKinnon (1963, p. 57) justifies this through examining how “when there is a higher 
degree of openness in the economy, the likelihood that foreign prices of tradables to the domestic 
cost of living is higher.” This demonstrates that fluctuations in nominal exchange rates will lead 
to influential offsetting changes in wages and prices in an open economy, depriving the floating 
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exchange rate of its effectiveness in changing the terms of trade in addition to its function as an 
adjustment mechanism.  
The bottom line from McKinnon’s examination is that the more open the economy is, the 
more arguments there are for joining a fixed exchange rate. The emphasis of the openness 
criteria leads to his point that open economies should pursue a fixed exchange rate. He suggests 
that open economies that frequently trade with each other should form a common currency area, 
since the monetary efficiency gain from the safeguarding of exchange rate fluctuations in this 
closed region would outweigh the costs of joining this regime.  
Moreover, McKinnon addresses that a smaller economy would benefit more in joining a 
large common currency area than large economy. The reasoning behind this is that the smaller 
economy is more likely to be open due to the fact that it not as self-sufficient as a larger 
economy. It is important to note that a small economy typically produces goods it has a 
comparative advantage in, while engaging in international trade for the rest of the goods it needs. 
Since a large part of its GDP is engaged in foreign trade, it displays how variations in the 
exchange rate influence a large portion of its economy. Overall, McKinnon’s contribution not 
only emphasizes the role of the size of an economy in forming an optimal currency area, but also 
demonstrates that the benefit forming a common currency area with fixed exchange rates is that 
it buffers the effects of exchange rate fluctuations. 
The final significant contributor to the development of the optimum currency area was 
Kenen (1969). This traditionalist scholar proposed that the product diversification of the 
economy is extremely important attribute with regards to forgoing an independent monetary 
policy and adjustable exchange rate regime for an optimal fixed exchange rate regime. Kenen 
(1969, p. 49) argues that the degree of product diversification, “the number of single-product 
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regions contained in a single country, may be more relevant than labour mobility” with regards 
to optimal currency area criterion. It important to note he introduced this new reason in the light 
that he did not believe that perfect labor mobility exists. Kenen’s examination of this tenet is that 
if a single-product economy, which also exports its only product, experiences a negative demand 
shock in a fixed-rate regime, it does not have the luxury of depreciating its exchange rate in order 
to address the fall in export revenue. The adjustment to this situation under a fixed exchange rate 
regime would have to be unfavorably tackled through a reduction of wages and prices, or even 
increase unemployment, since currency devaluation is not an option. Hence, Kenen argues that 
an optimal exchange rate regime is more attractive to highly diversified economies rather than 
single, or limited, diversified economies. The reasoning behind this as stated by Della and Tavlas 
(2009, p. 19) is that “diversification provides some insulation from effects of sector-specific or 
industry-specific shocks, forestalling the need of frequent terms-of-trade via the exchange rate.” 
Kenen furthers his point of view by arguing that highly diversified economies should be 
supplemented with a diversified export sector. Extending on McKinnon’s (1963) size of the 
economy criterion, Kenen demonstrates that highly diversified export economies are usually 
large economies due to their self-sufficient nature, while less diversified export economies are 
typically smaller economies. It is important to note that smaller, less diversified export 
economies need a higher degree of openness concerning importing goods in demand, and then 
exporting goods in return to be able to pay for their imports. Thus, Broz (2005, p. 59) points out 
“Kenen’s diversification criterion can be transformed into McKinnon’s openness criterion.” 
Kenen also adds onto Mundell’s argument that economies vulnerable to asymmetric 
shocks should pursue flexible exchange rates, as the costs of forgoing an independent monetary 
policy are higher the lower the association of shocks is between the regions. He explores the fact 
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that, given a high degree of labor mobility, it is optimal for two economies, which have similar 
production characteristics, to form a common currency union, as they are likely to experience 
similar industry specific shocks. Kenen also believes that fiscal integration should be a 
characteristic in assessing the optimality of two economies participating in common currency 
area. Furthering his point of view, Della and Tavlas (2009, p. 18) state that if an asymmetric 
shock hits a single currency area, the higher the levels of fiscal integration between regions, and 
“the greater the ability to smooth asymmetric shocks through fiscal transfers from a low-
employment region to a high-unemployment region.” On top this important viewpoint; Kenen 
ultimately demonstrates his ability to develop the insights of both Mundell and McKinnon in his 
argument pertaining to his most important attributes regarding optimum currency areas.  
Mundell (1961), McKinnon (1963), and Kenen (1969) are consistently viewed as the 
most important traditionalist scholars on the optimum currency area theory. These traditional 
contributors have developed relevant approaches in determining the way attributes of countries’ 
economies can influence the monetary efficiency gain of forming, or joining, an optimal 
exchange-rate regime. Mundell addressed the degree of labor mobility, wage and price 
flexibility, as well as the incidence of asymmetric shocks as the most important variables for 
judging whether it is optimal for two economies to form a currency union. McKinnon, on the 
other hand, argued the degree of openness in addition to the size of the economy were crucial 
factors in forming a common currency area. Kenen soon after identified characteristics 
pertaining to the degree of product diversification, similarity of production structures, and the 
level of fiscal integration that potential economies should ideally possess in forming a common 
currency area. With all this being said, the framework developed by these three authors was 
neither thoroughly developed nor consistent.     
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2.3 Modern views on the OCA Theory 
 
The theory of optimum currency areas was more of an academic question, as these three 
authors developed their works in a time characterized by the Bretton Woods exchange rate 
regime in addition to limited international capital mobility. Mundell (1961, 657) even mentioned 
that this theory was more of an academic question, “since it hardly appears within the realm of 
political feasibility that national currencies would ever be abandoned in favor of any other 
arrangement.” Nonetheless, the theory has evolved since these three influential papers, and a 
second wave of contributor renewed interest into the optimal currency area field since the 
European Union embarked on a monetary unification process. Following a period of stagnation 
in optimal currency area literature from the second half of 1970s to early 1990s, more recent 
scholars have developed research in light of this practical example, trying to fill in the gaps left 
by traditionalist scholars in determining whether or not the benefits of the Eurozone will 
outweigh the costs in the long run. Modern scholars typically recognize the possibility of the 
reverse occurring, where the costs of participating in a common currency area outweigh the 
benefits, yet they still propose solutions for further monetary integration.  
A good place in examining what issues recent optimal currency literature deals with is 
starting with the importance of labor mobility. Even though Mundell (1961) was the first to 
address the significance of labor mobility, Paul De Grauwe (2003) furthers this discussion by 
demonstrating the significance of different labor institutions with regards to optimal currency 
areas. De Grauwe points out that there could be three types of labor market centralization: (1) 
labor markets in which highly centralized unions dominate, (2) labor markets with intermediate 
union centralization, and (3) labor markets where unions are decentralized. Broz (2005, p. 68) 
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further demonstrates De Grauwe’s viewpoint by explaining that in markets where centralized 
unions dominate, or where there is wage bargaining centralization, “a supply shock will not lead 
to an excessive increase in nominal wages, since unions know that excessive wage increases will 
lead to more inflation, making real wages the same as before.” The same outcome goes for labor 
markets where unions are decentralized, as market unions at company level will not start the 
wage bargaining process when a supply shock hits due to the same logic.    
Labor markets that have intermediate union centralization, on the other hand, have 
different approach to supply shocks. According to Broz (2005, p. 69), a labor union in this 
market starts the wage bargaining process in light of a supply shock, since all the unions will be 
taking the same route, even though each unions knows that “its actions will have but a small 
effect on aggregate inflation.” It is important to note the members will end up with lower real 
wages than its counterparts will if its labor union does not push for higher wages. The excessive 
increase in nominal wages will lead further nominal inflation, making real wages the same as 
before. The acknowledgment of this criterion by De Grauwe demonstrates that it will be harder 
to adjust to a similar shock in a similar way in a common currency area when differences in labor 
market institutions exist. This is important because the difference between labor market 
institutions can cause the need for a different approach to the monetary policy. 
In determining whether to enter a common currency area, Alesina, et al., addressed the 
attributes of correlation of shocks in addition stabilization policy. They argue that the higher the 
association of shocks between a potential member of a common currency area, or client, and the 
so-called anchor, the more attractive joining a common currency area is for the client. This 
relationship suggests that the policy selected by the anchor will be suitable for the client when it 
is hit by a shock. Alesina, et al., (2002, p. 309) go on to discredit the importance behind the 
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similarity of shocks, emphasizing the “variance of the client’s country’s output expressed as a 
ration to the anchor country’s output.” This viewpoint demonstrates that even though a small 
country may be highly correlated in terms of output with an anchor, such as the European 
Monetary Union, if its variance of output is much greater than the anchors, then the cost of 
losing its independent monetary policy in exchange of joining a shared currency might not be 
worth it. The monetary policy of the anchor, or the European Central Banks, might not be 
suitable for the client when facing a shock. This analysis ultimately deemphasize Kenen’s (1969) 
argument that it is optimal for two economies, which have similar industry characteristics, to 
form a common currency union, as they are likely to experience correlated shocks. 
 Additionally, the viewpoint by Kenen (1969) that the higher the degree of fiscal 
integration between regions in an optimal currency area, the greater the ability it has in 
mitigating the asymmetric shock through fiscal transfers has proven to be too simplistic in 
practical terms. De Grauwe (2007) begins refuting this notion of a flexible fiscal adjustment 
through pointing out the unintended consequences of using fiscal transfers in response to a 
permanent shock hitting a common currency area. The unintended consequence of this situation 
is that the fiscal transfers would permanently shift the resources to the affected region, 
preventing necessary adjustment. It is important to note that issues pertaining controlling debt 
may arise through the continuous use of fiscal transfers. These two reasons also demonstrate that 
constraints may arise in the future from the use of fiscal transfers in the present. Dellas and 
Tavlas (2009, p. 24) demonstrate that De Grauwe addresses the situation where “a country with 
large fiscal deficits and a high debt-to-GDP ratio that is in a monetary union can create negative 
spillover effects for the rest of the union, driving the union’s interest rate upwards and increasing 
the burden of financing government debts in the other members of the union.” De Grauwe’s 
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argument supports implementing fiscal rules, instead utilizing fiscal transfers, in containing the 
size of budget deficits and government debt of weaker countries within a common currency area, 
as it reduces the negative spillover effects.    
 Additionally, Mundell (1961), McKinnon (1963), and Kenen (1969) discussed the 
attributes, such as, labor mobility and the openness of the economy, regarding optimal currency 
areas, but did not address if a single monetary policy can handle the asymmetric economic 
developments within different countries once they share a common currency area. Kroger and 
Redonnet (2001) explain the consequences of having asymmetric developed economies in a 
shared common currency area through an example where one country is a mature economy with 
high per capita income, while the other country is at an early stage of development with low per 
capita income. If a regional bank has been tasked with obtaining price stability, given that these 
two countries have formed a common currency area, the country at the early stage of 
development could face low interest in addition to high-expected rates of return on investment. 
These factors alongside free capital mobility according to Dellas and Tavlas (2009, p. 24) can 
lead to “overly-optimistic income expectations, a ‘‘wrong’’ incentive structure of investment 
(i.e., investment in high-risk projects that would not have been undertaken in the absence of low 
interest rates) and excessive domestic demand; and in light of the above, the economy concerned 
may eventually be faced with the need to undergo a prolonged deflation in order to regain 
competitiveness.” This argument emphasizes the use of real convergence criteria as a means of 
determining prospective members into a common currency area, since different developed 
economies might be more suitable under a regime of an autonomous monetary policy.   
 Finally, whereas the traditional framework on the theory of optimal currency area 
addressed the criteria an economy should meet before joining a common, while modern scholars 
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focused on changes in economic structure that may result from participation in a shared common 
currency area. This topic that recent scholars have addressed is called endogenous optimum-
currency area theory. Frankel and Rose (1997) demonstrate that not only is there a positive 
relationship between trade integration and income correlation, but also that increased trade in 
common currency area leads to more highly correlated business cycles. This relationship 
between trade integration and business synchronization exists due to the high accounts of intra-
industry trade or common demand shocks. Since countries forming a common currency have 
highly correlated business cycles, they will not need flexible exchange rates as an adjustment 
mechanism. This endogenous optimum-currency area theory demonstrates that participating in a 
common currency area outweighs the benefits of independent monetary policy since it reduces 
the frequency of asymmetric shocks, instead of focusing on the incidence of shocks as a criterion 
for entering a common currency by the traditionalist framework.  
 
2.4 Conclusion 
 
After 55 years since the Mundell’s (1961) paper, the optimal currency area theory has 
evolved. Much of the literature came before the Maastricht Treaty, and before the Eurozone had 
actually taken place, demonstrating that scholars developed their arguments and suggested 
criteria in forming an optimal currency area in light of no practical examples. The three 
influential traditional scholars introduced economic conditions (such as labor mobility and wage 
and price flexibility), varying level of developments (such as economic production structures and 
size of the economy), or differing sector diversification with regards to production and exports, 
all of which are considered relevant attributes for judging the optimality of a currency area. 
Modern scholars have contributed to optimal currency literature through identifying the gaps that 
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traditionalist scholars have overlooked. With the luxury of a working model, these scholars 
addressed the limits of fiscal policy, differences in the level of economic developments between 
countries, various labor institutions, correlation of shocks, as well as endogenous optimum-
currency area theory. Given that existing literature has addressed theory of optimal currency 
areas in lack of practical implications, as well as in response to the development of the Eurozone, 
limited work has been produced in examining whether or not the Eurozone is operating as an 
optimal currency area with regards to the current crisis.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
From the Years of Adjustment to the Crisis: Understanding the Root Causes 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
After 3 years of working with the euro as “book money” alongside national currencies, 
euro coins and banknotes were launched on January 1st, 2002 and the biggest cash changeover in 
history took place. The economies of the Eurozone enjoyed matching low interest rates and 
stable economic growth for almost a decade after the euro was officially launched on January 1st, 
1999. However, as the fallout of the global economic crises escalated in 2009, European markets 
became susceptible to the frightening levels of public debt in Portugal, Ireland, Italy, and Greece, 
skyrocketing interest rates, and fears of sovereign debt defaults. Now, in its 16th year of 
existence, the European single currency – the most daring act of integration since the launch of 
the European integration project – is facing its biggest challenge yet. Greece and Portugal are 
still experiencing economic hardships, even after receiving substantial bailout packages in order 
to avoid defaulting on their debt. Moreover, Italy and Spain – the third and fourth largest 
economies in the Eurozone - are also experiencing high public debts, large budget deficits, and 
low growth. Germany and France, considered the most robust economies of the Eurozone, are 
feeling the strain of supporting their weaker partners, in an attempt to save the euro. The 
economic importance of this crisis is that the future of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), 
the Eurozone, and the European economic integration is at stake.  
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3.2 Institutional Background & Convergence Criteria  
It has taken more than 30 years to create the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and 
Eurozone. The EMU project was the most decisive step in the process of European integration 
and cooperation. This long, slow process ultimately led to the creation of a single monetary 
policy, a new European Central Bank, and a new single currency. To begin, the Maastricht 
Treaty of 1992 paved the way for the introduction of the euro in 1999 and the circulation of euro 
notes and coins in 2002. The treaty established the EMU project and set the requirements for the 
gradual implementation of the EMU. This major step forward was largely based on the 
objectives of maintaining peace, stability, and prosperity in the early 1990s. The goal behind this 
convergence was the smooth adoption of the new common currency, which required a significant 
harmonization of economic policies and macroeconomic conditions in the countries that wanted 
to participate in the EU. Participating in this core European integration project was largely seen 
as the most appropriate pathway for economic prosperity.  
More specifically, the Maastricht Treaty outlined convergence criteria for the third stage 
of integration regarding achieving exchange rate stability, price stability, and maintaining a 
restrictive fiscal policy for EU countries in becoming an economic and monetary union 
according to Krugman (2015, p. 564). It is important to note that major economic problems and 
imbalances in one country could bring about problems to other countries. For this reason, the 
convergence policy period was the preparation stage for the countries. The several 
macroeconomics criteria included: (1) inflation of no more than 1.5 percentage points above the 
average rate of the three EU member states with the lowest national inflation rates among EU 
members over the previous year, (2) long term interest rates that should be no more than 1.5 % 
points above the rate in the three EU countries with the lowest inflation over the previous year, 
	 21	
(3) a national government deficit at or below 3% of GDP, and (4) a national government debt not 
exceeding 60% of GDP, although a country with a higher level of debt can still adopt the euro 
provided its debt level is falling steadily. And finally, the European Central Bank with the 
authority to exercise the monetary policy for the entire EMU was established, where the 
independent monetary policies no longer would be available after the adoption of the euro 
currency. 
Furthermore, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) was established thereafter in 1997 to 
ensure that the Maastricht Convergence Criteria would continue to apply once the common 
currency was launched. This pact was meant to ensure that no single member state, once a 
member of EMU, could free ride the system, for instance, by incurring high deficits and debt. It 
also aimed to enforce budget discipline and sound public finances among the countries 
participating in the euro. The SGP also was to govern the “excessive” debt and deficit procedure, 
which would be triggered by the national government deficit breaching 3% of GDP or national 
government debt nearing 60% of GDP. If countries did not follow these criteria, the SGP 
allowed for financial penalties on countries with “excessive” deficits or debts.  
The significance behind the macroeconomic convergence criteria, the strict control of 
high public debts, as well the further addition of the SGP was that low-inflation countries, such 
as Germany and France, wanted to assurance that other EMU counterparts would not only learn 
to prefer an environment of fiscal discipline, but also not exert excess inflationary pressure on 
the entire European economy. This environment was encouraged in hopes of preventing the euro 
in becoming a weak currency, not falling prey to the types of policies that fueled inflation in 
several European countries since the early 1970s. Having a controlled debt and deficit would 
also prevent the continuation of borrowing that may lead to decreased demand for its bonds. 
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Moreover, even as the euro launch came closer in 1997, the German public was opposed to the 
euro because of the opinion that strong, cautious governments in the EMU would face pressures 
to purchase debt from governments that borrowed more than they could afford to repay. The 
German government insisted that the criteria outlined in the Maastricht Treaty alongside the 
SGP’s criteria post-implementation of the Eurozone would prevent this from happening, 
fostering an environment with low inflation and fiscal restraint.  
Ironically, by the mid-1990s it became apparent that many countries, including the largest 
- and economically most important – Germany and France, were finding it difficult to meet the 
convergence criteria. At first, it was decided that only Austria, Denmark, Portugal, the 
Netherlands and Spain fulfilled the convergence criteria, while France and Germany did not 
fulfill the criteria. It was inconceivable to launch EMU without the two strongest economies. In 
the run-up to 1998, a facade of similarity and congruence between member states’ economies 
struggling to fulfill the criteria occurred. EU countries, such as Germany and France, through the 
means of “cooking the books” and using creative accounting squeezed their government budget 
deficits to within the 3% of GDP criteria by the Maastricht treaty. On other hand, countries, such 
as Italy and Greece, had levels of debt and deficit relative to GDP well above the limit of the 
treaty. The treaty, nonetheless, dismissed these circumstances given the fact that these countries 
were demonstrating that the level of debt was declining. Eventually, in May 1998, the Council 
decided 11 countries were ready to join. 
 
3.3 Unfolding the Eurozone Crisis 
The creation of the euro was once again largely stimulated by political consideration in 
addition to economic policy priorities extrictably linked to the fulfillment of the Maastricht 
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Criteria. Main economic trends in the post euro period-included poor governance and fiscal 
expansion, which were supposed to be supervised by the European Commission. This 
demonstrated that the greatest weakness of the SGP was the fact that a qualified majority of 
Eurozone members in its ECOFIN Council was required in order to approve any further 
procedural steps. The weakness meant that countries that were in violation of the criteria retained 
the right to vote and needed only a few additional countries to block such steps, hence 
incentivizing countries with high levels of deficits “to vote against sanctions for fear that these 
would be applied against themselves” according to Ngai (2012, p. 2).  
The EC not only failed to impose the appropriate penalties, but also set a negative 
precedent, a bad signal that there were no effective rules on budget deficits in the EMU. Despite 
the SGP obligations, especially running fiscal deficits no more than 3% of GDP, there was a 
significant fiscal deterioration for the PIIG countries from the early 2000s onwards after entering 
the common currency area. These observations can be seen in Figure 3.1 and 3.2:  
Figure 3.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Source: OCED (See Appendix 1 for more detail) 
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Figure 3.2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: OCED (See Appendix 2 for more detail) 
These graphs clearly show that the SGP failed to impose strict requirements to member states. 
Instead of a gradual convergence, divergence emerged since there were good performers and 
laggards in the Eurozone. Moreover, the fiscal relaxation was not only strictly an economic 
reality in the PIIG countries, but also among stronger Eurozone economies like Germany and 
France. The negative precedent set by both Germany and France led to undercutting the 
effectiveness of the SGP, which helped foster an environment of fiscal irresponsibility in several 
countries, especially Greece, according to Wihlborg (2010, p. 22).  
 The EC’s failing to impose the appropriate penalties, as well as negative precedent set by 
Germany and France, were indeed significant factors contributing to increases of the public debt 
and deficit of the PIIG countries. However, as these factors did contribute to the fiscal 
irresponsibility of these countries, it is important to note that the massive public debt was also 
largely fueled by European funds from private and central banks in the low interest rate 
environment. But more importantly, PIIG countries were investing in an unsustainable growth 
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model, which will be discussed in the following section. The whole system could have worked 
properly as long as PIIG countries had to opportunity to refinance its debt, yet the PIIG 
economies remained institutionally weak and vulnerable. The global financial crisis of 2007-
2008 would reveal these weaknesses.  
Once the financial crisis of 2007-08 hit the Eurozone, Germany took on further debt in 
order to provide for further fiscal stimulus. The increased fiscal stimulus in return would increase 
public spending to ease the effects of the financial crisis. Numerous EU countries imitated this 
plan of action. Unlike Germany, the majority of these countries did not have the financial 
standing to do so, since they were more deeply indebted. As the fallout of the global economic 
crisis was escalating, the European Commission was very concerned Greece’s spiraling public 
debt, as it began to affect the stability of the euro. The Commission was also particularly 
concerned about levels of public debt in Ireland, Spain, Italy and France.  
More specifically, Greece –as the weakest link in the Eurozone – rapidly became the 
target of aggressive speculation, as many saw an opportunity to benefit from volatile markets 
dealing with sovereign credit default swaps. Rating agencies subsequently started to downgrade 
Greek bank and government debt. Over time, international investors and lenders became 
increasingly nervous that the Greek government’s public debt was unsustainable and that it 
would default on its debt. Thus, they started demanding higher interest rates for buying and 
holding Greek bonds, which drove up Greece’s borrowing costs (see Appendix 3 for more 
detail), exacerbated its debt levels, and caused Greece to veer towards default. This would cause 
the debt crisis to spiral out of control, engulfing not only Portugal and Ireland, but also much 
larger economies such as Spain and Italy, all of which were on the periphery with similar near-
unsustainable public finances.   
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3.4 Structural Issues 
Policy makers adopted a very short-term perspective. Every country, which wanted to 
participate in the EMU, had to comply with monetary and fiscal economic targets. Even though a 
“strict” mechanism of implementing macroeconomic conditions was in place, a specific 
mechanism for the coordination of the implementation of structural reforms did not exist. Policy 
makers built a common currency area without an adequate economic governance to harmonize 
and coordinate economic policies across the EMU. They did not predict the economic and 
institutional implications of a future debt-crisis. Actually, they believed that this was impossible 
to happen, and did not proceed further in the political union to establish common economic 
policies and common economic institutions. 
 Furthermore, these policy makers clearly did not address the concerns of both 
traditionalist and modern optimal currency area economists regarding meeting the criteria for an 
economically efficient common currency area. Wihlborg (2010, p. 4) points out that one of the 
most important criteria based on Mundell (1961) is that “economies in a currency area should 
have considerable flexibility in terms of factor mobility and/or wage and price flexibility in order 
to allow economic adjustments without provoking recessions in the absence of the ability to 
change national exchange rates and, thereby, relative costs.” As previously mentioned, Kroger 
and Redonnet (2001) emphasized the use of using real convergence criteria, like factor mobility 
and/or wage and price flexibility, in addressing if a single monetary policy can handle 
asymmetric economic developments within different countries once they share a common 
currency area. This criterion, nonetheless, was not included in the Maastricht Treaty or the SGP, 
and hence, was not satisfied by a several of the entering Eurozone members.  
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Once economists recognized that this real convergence was not included, they assumed 
changes in economic structure would emerge from participation in a shared common currency 
area. The endogenous OCA theory was right in demonstrating that the conditions after, not 
before, the formation of the Eurozone was more relevant to its successful operation as a common 
currency area, partially refuting Kroger and Redonnet’s (2001) argument. The Eurozone 
members did positively converge towards meeting several of the optimal currency area criteria, 
specifically with trade, however they had more problematic issues with regards to more 
flexibility in labor markets and asymmetric economic developments. It is important to note that 
the convergence “movements needed to be strong enough to substantially improve the workings 
of the internal adjustment process and reduce the generation of disturbances for which 
adjustment would be needed”, according Wihlborg (2010, p. 4). The reasoning behind this lack 
of convergence was the unaccounted excessive pressures from political economy forces and 
distorted incentives. The threat of not being able to join the euro area, which led to an initial 
success with fiscal consolidation in Europe, was also no longer there. Thus, almost as soon as the 
euro had been introduced, consolidation fatigue set in, and not only fiscal policies, but more 
importantly, structural reforms were relaxed.   
With bullish markets in addition to easy financing, the PIIG countries, especially Greece, 
fell to the threats of excessive pressures from the traditional economic sectors, the use of easy 
access to credit to finance domestic private and public consumption, neglect the requirements of 
sustainable growth, and more importantly, the idea that the single currency was the adequate 
condition for economic convergence without more structural effort in direction of high 
productivity and competitiveness. Furthermore, the European structural funds and borrowed 
funds were not channeled into productive investments that would generate future growth and 
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increase competiveness of the economy. Instead, those capital flows and the easy access to credit 
were used to fund public and private consumption. Germany and France, on the other hand, 
stayed fairly disciplined competitively than most Eurozone countries, and thus were able to ease 
the effects of the financial crisis through taking “the injunction that joining an area of fixed 
exchange rates greatly increased the need for improving the internal flexibility of economies”, 
according to Wihlborg (2010, p. 22).  
3.5 Conclusion 
The Eurozone countries had an extraordinary opportunity to pave the way for rapid 
economic development and modernization, with sustainable growth rates, and new, open and 
high quality economic and political institutions after joining the common currency area. This 
economic environment was truly favorable. More specifically, the macroeconomic conditions, 
the hard currency, the high investors’ confidence, and the opportunity to access international 
capital markets for cheap credit were the most appropriate requirements. Nonetheless, the ability 
to exploit these advantages properly for certain countries, specifically the PIIG countries, was 
largely based on two major conditions: maintain fiscal discipline and sound finances, while 
increasing the productivity and the competitiveness of their respective economies. Despite all the 
PIIG countries failing to maintain fiscal discipline, certain PIIG countries, such as Greece, failed 
to maintain competiveness in international markets. It would have been sufficient, if they had 
used the borrowed funds to spur production capacity, including the export sector.  								
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
Diverging Competitiveness among Key Eurozone Nations 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Certain PIIG countries within the Eurozone had the idea that the common currency was 
an adequate condition for economic convergence without more structural effort in direction of 
high productivity and competitiveness. The costs of entering the EU for these countries was 
forgoing an independent exchange rate and no longer having an independent monetary policy, 
where sovereign governments can no longer manage the exchange rate so as to address the 
country’s international competitiveness issues nor can they influence the money supply so as to 
address aggregate demand and/or inflation/deflation problems. These member states can 
therefore only compete in international markets with their fixed exchange rates where adjusting 
unit labor costs is their main option. More specifically, in order to address international 
competitiveness issues, the only two options left under the Eurozone are wage decreases and/or 
productivity enhancements. In this chapter, we will start by examining the current account 
balances of Germany, France, and the PIIG countries in subsection 4.2. We will then turn to an 
examination of the unit labor costs, productivity, and hourly wage rate between Germany and 
Greece in subsection 4.3, followed by Germany and Ireland in subsection 4.4. An examination of 
these variables will also be done with the remaining select Eurozone countries in subsection 4.5.  
 
4.2 Current Account Balance 
 Although it is widely acknowledged that Eurozone’s elites need to address unsustainable 
fiscal conditions in deficit countries, they must also address their lack of competitiveness. This 
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lack of competitiveness can be observed through examining the current account balances of 
select Eurozone countries, as Figure 3 and Current Account Balance Table show.  
Figure 4.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Source: OECD (Refer to Appendix 4) 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Source: OECD (Refer to Appendix 4 for additional data) 
In assessing the current account balances of France and Germany, these countries have 
substantially improved their current account balance, especially Germany, since the creation of 
the euro. Moreover, Germany running a big surplus can be attributed to not only its industrial 
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nature, but also its initiative in reducing manufacturing costs, according to Krugman (2015, p. 
576).  
In contrast, current account deficits expanded, and in some cases to staggeringly, large 
levels for Greece and Portugal. By 2008, Greece and Portugal respectively reached the 
unprecedented deficit of 15.1 and 12.1 percent of their output. The slowly improving, yet 
staggering current account deficit levels of Greece and Portugal raised flags, indicating their 
export prices were too high in terms of international competitiveness. It is important to 
understand that Portugal and Greece under the fixed euro currency would have to turn to 
decreasing its respective unit labor costs through depressing wages and/or improving its 
productivity in an effort to restore their export price indices competitiveness. This situation in 
which Portugal and Greece experienced a negative demand shock in a fixed-rate regime and its 
consequences is mentioned in Kenen’s (1969) examination of degree of product diversification. 
He points out the undesirable effects that may occur for a single-product economy if it 
experiences a negative demand shock in a fixed-rate regime. Kenen goes on to demonstrate that 
the adjustment to this fall in export revenue under a fixed exchange rate regime would have to be 
unfavorably tackled through a reduction of wages and prices, since currency devaluation is not 
an option. Hence, Kenen argues that being a member of a common currency area with a single 
product economy is not as attractive and/or beneficial as it seems. Finally, the fact that Greece, a 
limited, diversified economy, experienced similar unfavorable consequences to that of a single-
product after experiencing a negative demand shock strengthens Kenen’s argument.  
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Productivity, Unit Labor Costs, and Hourly Wage Rates: Germany v. Greece 
To begin, labor productivity rates among the selected Eurozone countries are another 
important aspect that needs to be assessed. Similar rates of labor productivity are important for 
Eurozone countries because if they have diverging rates, then there is very limited action that the 
EMS can take to ease these disparities. Without an independent monetary policy, sovereign 
nation-states no longer have the luxury of devaluing its currency in order to restore 
competitiveness. Therefore, those members of the Eurozone must turn to wage decreases and/or 
productivity enhancement as a result.  
Furthermore, in assessing the correlation and trends between unit labor costs, 
productivity, and labor costs per hour between select Eurozone countries, one will be able to 
notice if there are any notable divergences in labor productivity trends.  It is important to note 
that certain figures below contain normalized data. This normalized data has a clarity element to 
it compared to actual data. Moreover, I presented the normalized data because they are unit free, 
allowing one to look at the correlation and trends between unit labor costs, productivity, and 
labor costs per hour. The way the data is normalized for each data series in EViews is in the 
following equation: 𝑋𝑡	$%̅' , where Xt is the actual observation of the respective variable for each 
year, x̅ is the average of all observations of the respective variable for the sample period, and S 
is the standard deviation of all observations of the respective variable for the sample period. The 
normalized data allows for compiling data that have different units and/or are on different scales. 
Now, we will examine the trends in the factors mentioned above between Germany and Greece 
in the following charts. 
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Figure 4.2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: OECD, Eurostat, and Haver Analytics 
 
Figure 4.3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: OECD, Eurostat, and Haver Analytics 
	 34	
Figure 4.4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: OECD, Eurostat, and Haver Analytics 
 
Figure 4.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: OECD, Eurostat, and Haver Analytics 
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In Figure 5, Germany shows a steady upward trend in productivity growth, while its unit 
labor costs took a dip between 2003 and 2009. Turning to Figure 4, the nation’s hourly wage rate 
has also steadily increased since 2004 until the end of the Global Financial Crisis, and then 
increased up until 2016. It can also be noted that once Germany approximately entered the 
Eurozone, its productivity started to trend above its unit labor costs for the majority of its time, 
right up until 2012. Even though its units labor costs rate rose higher than its productivity after 
2012, which could be considered a threat to Germany’s competitiveness, its hourly wage rate 
stayed aligned with its productivity growth.  
Greece, on the other hand, showed a rapid increase in productivity growth from 1995 
until 2009, where it slightly more than doubled its level of productivity from approximately 11 to 
24 GDP per hour worked in euros according to Figure 7. The nation’s unit labor cost quickly 
increased from 1995 until 2010, where it also slightly more than doubled from approximately 47 
to 100. The alignment of both the rapid productivity and unit labor cost rates were also cyclical, 
depicted in Figure 5. The catch, nonetheless, is that Germany increased its level of productivity 
at a sizeable, yet gradual rate from approximately 33 to 52 GDP per hour worked in euros, while 
simultaneously having a moderate growth in unit labor costs when compared to Greece in the 
span of 1995 until 2015.  
Additionally, Greece’s hourly wage rate skyrocketed from 2004 until 2008. It is 
important to note that its hourly wage growth was roughly aligned with productivity up until 
2008. After 2008, a steady decline in both productivity and unit labor costs occurred in Greece. 
More importantly, the unit labor costs was above its productivity rate for the majority of this 
decline, indicating a strong threat to its cost competitiveness, if other costs were not adjusted in 
compensation. Greece’s hourly wage rate also immediately plummeted afterward, nowhere near 
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being aligned with the declining trends of productivity and unit labor costs after the Financial 
Crisis. Besides a dive in hourly wage growth a few years after the financial crisis for Portugal 
(refer to Appendix 6B), the significant wage decreases that Greece experienced did not occur in 
neither Germany, France, or its other PIIG peers.   
An important observation from this comparison is the steady trend in productivity growth 
in Germany, and a decline in productivity in Greece starting around 2008. This is a crucial 
problem according to OCA literature because countries sharing a common currency should 
maintain similar productivity rates, since there is very limited action that the EMS can take to fix 
this misalignment. It is important to understand that if Greece had its own currency in the 
situation, it could have devalued its currency to maintain competitiveness. However, lacking its 
independent monetary policy, it went through a painful period of wage decreases from 2008 until 
2014 in trying to maintain its competitiveness. Therefore, it seems that the wage decreases, while 
contributing to a decline in current account deficit as a percentage of GDP (e.g. from -15.2 in 
2007 to -11.4 in 2010), was not sufficient. This is because productivity declines did not help, and 
of course, no currency devaluation could be performed.  
Furthermore, Mundell (1961) proposed labor mobility, wage and price flexibility, as well 
as the incidence of asymmetric shocks as the most relevant attributes for judging the optimality 
of a currency area. Wihlborg (2010, p. 4) also points out how Mundell states “economies in a 
currency area should have considerable flexibility in terms of factor mobility and/or wage and 
price flexibility in order to allow economic adjustments without provoking recessions in the 
absence of the ability to change national exchange rates and, thereby, relative costs.” More 
specifically, Mundell outlines an ideal situation of wage and price flexibility in which a region, 
such as Germany, has an obligation to increase its domestic demand at a greater rate to assist 
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with the adjustment of imbalances for another region, such as Greece, within the Eurozone. This 
adjustment by Germany would result in fewer products being bought in its own nation, while 
more products being bought in Greece, therefore providing evidence of wage and price flexibility 
restoring stability in the incident of asymmetric shocks in a common currency area.  
However, in the examination of data of Germany and Greece, Germany went from a 
current account balance of 4.6 in 2005 to 5.6 in 2010, while Greece went from a current account 
balance of -8.9 in 2005 to -11.4 in 2010 after undergoing the Great Recession. This situation 
between Germany and Greece indicates wage and price stickiness in the Eurozone, since neither 
a decrease in Germany’s current account balance nor an increase in Greece’s current account 
balance occurred to restore stability in light of an asymmetric shock. Therefore, Mundell argues 
that not only wage and price flexibility fails to exist in the Eurozone, but also suggests that these 
existing members are not making this common currency area as stable as it seems.   
Productivity, Unit Labor Costs, and Hourly Wage Rates: Germany v. Ireland 
Now, we will examine the trends in the factors mentioned above between Germany and 
Ireland in the following charts. 
Figure 4.6 
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Figure 4.7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9 
 
Source: OECD, Eurostat, and Haver Analytics 
 
Figure 4.8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: OECD, Eurostat, and Haver Analytics 
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Figure 4.9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: OECD, Eurostat, and Haver Analytics 
Ireland has an interesting relationship concerning its rate of productivity, unit labor costs, 
as well as current account balance compared to its fellow PIIG countries. This Eurozone member 
state beginning from 1995 until around 2005 had steady upward trends in both productivity and 
unit labor costs rates, where the rate of productivity was slightly above the rate of unit labor costs 
according to Figure 8. In the following years from 2005 until 2008, the unit labor costs 
significantly spiked up, which was also accompanied by widening current account deficit from    
-3.5 to -6.5 percentage of GDP. The reasoning behind this decrease in Ireland’s competitiveness 
was that its increasing unit labor costs made the nation’s export price indices less competitive, or 
an increase in its export price, in international markets and hence decreasing its exports, which is 
demonstrated through its declining current account balance. Furthermore, the rate of 
productivity, on the other hand, during the Great Recession slightly dipped, but more importantly 
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has steadily risen since 2009 until 2015. It is interesting to note that Ireland’s level of 
productivity in the span of 1995 to 2015 increased approximately from 20 to 74 GDP per hour 
worked in euros according to Figure 10. Ireland’s sizable increase in its productivity capacity 
was not only larger than Germany’s, but also significantly more than any of its PIIG peers from 
this time span. 
In addition to the rate of productivity increasing, Ireland has an interesting trend in that 
its unit labor costs decreased dramatically compared to its PIIG peers since 2009. It is important 
to note that this significant decrease in its unit labor costs was also supplemented with significant 
increase in its current account balance, which went from a deficit of -6.5 percentage of GDP in 
2008 to a surplus of 10.2 percentage of GDP in 2015. Moreover, given the high output Ireland’s 
economy receives relative to its wages, alongside its increasing productivity rates, the nation 
promoted a sufficient growth model based on productivity enhancement in restoring its 
competitiveness in the international market. The significant increase in Ireland’s current account 
balance from 2008 to 2015 provides further evidence that Ireland’s productivity enhancement 
was sufficient in producing goods at a competitive export price in international markets without 
the need to devalue wages.  
 
Productivity, Unit Labor Costs, and Hourly Wage Rates of Remaining Countries 
The remaining countries that need to be examined include France, Portugal, and Italy. 
First off, France is quite comparable to Germany, as the nation shows a strong, steady upward 
trend in both productivity and unit labor costs rates. Once France approximately entered the 
Eurozone, its productivity started to trend above its unit labor costs up until around 2009, and 
then the respective variables aligned cyclically thereafter (refer to Appendix 6A). More 
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specifically, France increased its level of productivity at a sizeable, yet gradual rate from 
approximately 32 to 54 GDP per hour worked in euros, while simultaneously having a moderate 
growth in unit labor costs from 1995 until 2015 (refer to Appendix 7A). The Eurozone member 
state’s hourly wage rate rapidly increased from 2004 until 2012, and eventually aligned just 
below both productivity and unit labor costs after 2012. France overall demonstrates relatively 
uniform shifts in productivity, unit labor costs, as well as hourly wages to Germany, maintaining 
its international competitiveness.  
Turning to Portugal, the nation exhibits steady growth trends in both its productivity and 
unit labor costs. Unlike France, Germany, and Italy, once Portugal approximately entered the 
Eurozone, its unit labor cost rate rose higher than its productivity rate up until 2011. This 
indicates that Portugal’s unit labor costs are too expensive to be competitive in international 
markets, as the per unit labor cost exceeds the per unit productivity. The trend was also 
accompanied by its hourly wage rate increasing from 2004 to 2012, where it eventually 
surpassed Portugal’s productivity rate in 2012 (refer to Appendix 6B). Since Portugal workers 
are less competitive via productivity rates, the nation turned to depressing their worker’s wages 
(e.g. from 2012 to 2014 in Appendix 6B) in an effort to reduce the cost of production to restore 
its competitiveness in the international market. Even though we do see wages decline in 
Portugal, since the nation could not devalue its currency under the Eurozone, Portugal’s 
productivity rate steadily increased, quite noticeably above its unit labor costs since 2012. 
Nonetheless, Portugal’s restoration of its export price competitiveness through its adjustments 
mentioned remains uncertain after examining its current account balance (e.g. -1.8 in 2012 to 0.4 
2015). 
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The last selected Eurozone country of examination is Italy, which displays upward trends 
for both productivity and unit labor costs. Once Italy entered the Eurozone, its productivity 
started to trend above its unit labor costs up until around 2009, and then the respective variables 
aligned cyclically thereafter (refer to Appendix 6C). Moreover, the nation’s hourly wage rate 
rapidly increased from 2004 until 2012, and eventually aligned just below both productivity and 
unit labor costs after 2012. Italy’s trends overall demonstrate that the adjustment in its 
productivity enhancement, alongside forgoing wage decreases, while contributing to a rise in 
current account balance as a percentage of GDP (e.g. from -2.8 in 2008 to 1.9 in 2014), was 
sufficient in maintaining its competitiveness in international markets.   																												
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
Conclusion and Considerations for Follow Up  
 
 
Optimal currency area theory provided me with a useful framework for determining 
whether a Eurozone member nation should continue being a part of the common currency area. 
The results from my findings in Chapter 4 showed us that the euro would best serve the 
economic interests of each of its members if steady trends in productivity growth were 
accompanied by competitive wages and moderate growth in unit labor costs. In the case of 
Germany, France, and Italy from the PIIG nations, these countries demonstrated that the loss of 
monetary independence and flexible exchange rate were not high costs for these key countries. It 
is important to note that steady trends in productivity growth, which were also growing faster 
than their respective rates of unit labor costs for the majority of the period, occurred in these 
countries from the beginning of the euro until 2015. Therefore, the trends in Germany, France, as 
well as Italy, demonstrate that the adjustment in their productivity enhancements, alongside 
forgoing wage decreases, while contributing to increases in their respective current account 
balances as a percentage of GDP, was sufficient in maintaining competitiveness in international 
markets.   
Furthermore, Ireland has a unique case, where its unit labor costs significantly spiked up, 
which was also accompanied by widening current account deficit from 2005 until 2008, after 
experiencing steady productivity rate trends in its early membership in the euro. The reasoning 
behind this decrease in Ireland’s competitiveness was that its increasing unit labor costs made the 
nation’s export price indices less competitive in international markets and thus decreasing its 
exports, which is demonstrated through its declining current account balance. Soon enough, 
nonetheless, Ireland’s rate of productivity recovered and then increased significantly, while its 
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unit labor costs have simultaneously decreased dramatically since 2009. These trends in Ireland’s 
economy demonstrate how the nation implemented a sufficient growth model based on 
productivity enhancement in restoring its competitiveness in the international market. The 
significant increase in Ireland’s current account balance after the Great Recession provides 
further evidence that Ireland’s productivity enhancement was sufficient in producing goods at a 
competitive export price in international markets without the need to devalue wages.  
After the examination of productivity, unit labor costs, hourly wage rates, and net export 
performance as a percentage of GDP of Germany, France, Italy, and Ireland, I argue that there is 
sufficient, positive economic convergence and performance in terms of international 
competitiveness under the uniform policy of the ECB for these countries since joining the 
Eurozone. Moreover, I conclude that these countries should continue being members of 
Eurozone, since these countries could compete with their fixed euro, while simultaneously 
increasing their export price competitiveness in international markets through productivity 
enhancement, forgoing the depression of wages. Moreover, they benefit from the positive aspects 
of a monetary union. 
On the other hand, trends in Portugal, and especially Greece, indicated that both countries 
have an underlying structural deficit in comparison to Germany, France, Italy, and Ireland. The 
reasoning behind this underlying structural deficit is that consolidation fatigue quickly set in 
these countries after joining the Eurozone, resulting in stagnant structural efforts towards using 
borrowed funds to spur their production capacities, especially their export sectors. Unlike the 
previously mentioned countries, both Greece and Portugal experienced unit labor costs growing 
at a faster rate than productivity rates, indicating international competitiveness issues, such as 
export products becoming too expensive in international markets. 
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	Furthermore, I reiterate the fact that Greece is in a far worse economic position 
compared to Portugal, as it went through a painful period of wage devaluation from 2008 until 
2014. Both members of the EMU turned to depressing wages in expectations of unit labor costs 
to decrease, making the nation’s export price indices more competitive and therefore increasing 
its net export performance as a percentage of GDP. It is important to recap that Greece and 
Portugal could not turn to devalue their individual currency since they are both members under 
the euro where they no longer have control over their exchange rates. Hence, the only two 
options left as adjustment mechanisms for them are wage decreases and productivity 
enhancements.  
However, in the case of Greece, even though we do see wage declines, we do not see 
productivity enhancements and we do not see a dramatic improvement in its current account 
balance. Therefore, all the above facts, support that the conclusion that Greece would be better 
off leaving the Eurozone, and as a result, regaining control over its domestic monetary policy, 
such as performing exchange rate devaluation, making its export price indices more competitive 
and thus increasing its net export performance as a percentage of GDP. In the case of Portugal, 
even though we do see wages decline, not nearly to the same extent as Greece, we do see 
productivity enhancements, but do not see a drastic improvement in its net export performance as 
a percentage of GDP. Thus, as of right now, it seems reasonable for Portugal to remain in the 
Eurozone, since it has observed a steady increase in its productivity rate, quite noticeably above 
its unit labor costs since 2012. Portugal’s needs to focus on significantly improving its current 
account balance through great productivity enhancement and/or reasonable wage depression in 
the immediate future in order to avoid Greece’s future path.   
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Apart from the current account balances, productivity, unit labor costs, and hourly wage 
rate evidence that I provided in this paper, an interesting and relevant avenue of future research 
would be to examine the export price indices for the select Eurozone countries in my sample. 
Examining export price indices would provide further valuable insight because it correlates with 
two sides of this study. On the one hand, export price indices would correlate with both 
productivity and unit labor costs trends, providing evidence as to whether or not decreases in this 
variable are attributable to lower unit labor costs within the country. On the other hand, export 
price indices might correlate with current account balances, providing evidence regarding the 
strength of the relationship between export prices and net current account performance. The 
results from this examination would be further evidence as to whether or not a member state in 
the Eurozone should reconsider regaining its control over domestic monetary policy, forgoing 
the euro and the common currency area.  
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Appendix 5H* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Eurostat 
*Methodology:  
After calculating the annual growth rate percentages for both ULC Index and Labor Costs 
per Hour in Euro, I determined that the annual percentages in Appendix 5G were comparable.  
Afterwards, I took the annual growth rates that I have calculated in Appendix 5F, and then did an 
interpolation between 2004-2008 and again for 2008-2012 for each country and EU19.  
More specifically, in the case of Greece, starting from 2004, which 15.3 is the labor costs 
per hour in euro in Appendix 5E, and then applied the growth rate of 2.3657 (respectively under 
Greece’s column for the 2004-2008 row in Appendix 5f). This allowed me to interpolate the 
approximate hourly wage rate of 15.7 for Greece in 2005. I followed this procedure over and 
over to fill in the gaps until I reached 2008. From 2008, I applied the growth rate of -1.6787%, 
and proceeded with the same steps. Finally, I continued this procedure for each of remaining 
countries.  
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Source: (OECD, Eurostat, and Haver Analytics) 
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Source: (OECD, Eurostat, and Haver Analytics) 
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Source: (OECD, Eurostat, and Haver Analytics) 
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Source: (OECD, Eurostat, and Haver Analytics) 
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Source: (OECD, Eurostat, and Haver Analytics) 
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Source: (OECD, Eurostat, and Haver Analytics) 
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Source: (OECD, Eurostat, and Haver Analytics) 
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Appendix 7D 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: (OECD, Eurostat, and Haver Analytics) 
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Data Description 
 
CODE Data Description  Source 
COUNTRY ACRONYM 
 
GEà Germany 
GRà Greece 
ITLà Italy 
IRLà Ireland 
FRAà France 
EU à Eurozone (19) 
 
  
PRO“COUNTRY ACRONYM”: 
 
PROGE; PROGR; PROITL; PROIRE; 
PROFRA; PROPOR; PROITA; PROEU  
Level of GDP per capita and 
productivity, GDP per hour worked 
in national currency (current prices), 
1995-2015 
 
OECD 
ULC “COUNTRY ACRONYM”: 
ULCGE; ULCGR; UCLITL; ULCIRE; 
ULCFRA; ULCPOR ULCITA; ULCEU 
Unit labor costs, By persons 
employed (Total Economy), 
2010=100, 1995 – 2016 
 
Haver 
Analytics 
LABEUR “COUNTRY ACRONYM”: 
 
LABEURGE; LABEURGR; 
LABEURITL; LABEURIRE; 
LABEURFRA; LABEURPOR; 
LABEURITA; LABEUREU 
Labor costs per Hour in Euro, whole 
economy (excluding agriculture and 
public administration), 2004-2014 
Eurostat 
 	
